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Religion in the Trenches: Liberation Theology and Evangelical Protestantism 
as Tools of Social Control in the Guatemalan Civil War (1960-1996)
Abstract
During the early years of Guatemala’s 
civil war (1960-1996), which pitted 
the right-wing military regime against 
leftist revolutionaries, liberation theol-
ogy became popular among some in the 
Latin American clergy. Fearing that this 
new ideology would inspire indigenous 
populations to join the rebels, the dicta-
torship looked to suppress the movement 
inside Guatemala. This research looks 
at liberation theology, its prominence in 
the context of the Guatemalan civil war, 
and the military dictatorship’s use of 
the opposing tenants of Fundamentalist 
Protestantism to counter liberation theol-
ogy’s mass appeal, particularly the ideas 
of institutionalized sin and the necessity 
of popular action to exact change.
Appearing gaunt and with hollow, 
distant eyes, Father Luis Eduardo Pellecer 
stepped to the bevy of microphones at a 
podium surrounded by army officers. In 
a vapid, monotone voice, the Jesuit priest 
regaled the Guatemalan television audi-
ence with a remarkable story that reached 
deep into the soul of the nation. Original-
ly believed to have been murdered, the 
Jesuit Priest instead reemerged from 113 
days of captivity on 30 September 1981. 
Explaining his mysterious and violent 
disappearance at the hands of unidenti-
fied men as a “self-imposed kidnapping,” 
the now repentant Pellecer provided a 
vivid account of the struggle for control 
of the hearts and minds of the Guatema-
lan people interwoven into the civil war. 
As if reading from a prepared script, the 
seemingly brainwashed priest described 
how Catholic organizations had utilized 
religious mobilization in conspiring with 
armed guerilla groups to build a political 
base with which to spread their revolu-
tionary ideals. Key to the development 
of that following was the progressive 
Catholic ideology of Liberation Theol-
ogy, which up until his abduction, Father 
Pellecer had embraced and actively dis-
seminated from the pulpit. Following his 
“self-imposed kidnapping,” the priest felt 
the need to expose this scheme and stop 
this disgraceful use of the Word of God.1
 Father Pellecer’s frightening ordeal is 
indicative of the role religion played in 
Guatemala throughout its history and, 
more specifically, its 36-year civil war. 
Religion was a dangerous yet promi-
nent aspect of life in this small Central 
American country that, during those 
brutal decades, seemed forsaken by God. 
This conspiracy, conceived in an army 
prison and reiterated from the mouth of 
a tortured and troubled priest, exempli-
fied how the military government saw 
progressive Catholic activism, specifi-
cally Liberation Theology, as a threat 
in the same vein as armed resistance 
movements. The military regimes’ and 
death squads’ attempts to suppress both 
subversive activity and armed rebellion 
resulted in the death or disappearance 
Bryan Manewal
McNair Scholar
David Stark, Ph.D.
Faculty Mentor
50
of an estimated 200,000 Guatemalans.2 
From the late 1960s to the early 1980s, 
during the most violent years of the 
conflict, local and international changes 
in religious doctrine and practices 
exacerbated this brutality. These fac-
tors gave the concepts of religiosity and 
faith a unique significance in Guatemala. 
Throughout the Guatemalan civil war, 
the government’s fear of the socially and 
politically progressive Catholic ideology 
of Liberation Theology, coupled with 
their own long-held vision of modern-
izing the indigenous populations by 
transforming their social structure, led to 
a brutal program of forced conversion to 
Fundamentalist Protestant ideologies that 
focused on the individuality of salvation 
and believer’s submission to authority.
 The relationship between the Catholic 
Church and the institutional state has 
always been precarious in Guatemala. 
During the colonial period, the interests 
of these two prominent institutions fre-
quently overlapped and conflicted. Once 
the small Central American province 
broke from the Spanish empire in 1824 
amidst the wave of independence move-
ments sweeping across Latin America, 
the role of the Church within the state 
became a key issue in the direction of 
the new country. While members of the 
Conservative Party wanted to maintain 
the legacy of Spanish imperialism, Lib-
eral Party members wanted to modern-
ize the country.3 Limiting the power of 
the Church was one potential method of 
accomplishing this goal, since Liber-
als saw the Church as an impediment to 
modernization and a visage of the old 
colonial system.4 From the onset of the 
short-lived United Provinces of Central 
America in the 1820s, successive Liberal 
governments in Guatemala were effec-
tive in curbing the Church’s power and 
influence in the country. The government 
put limitations on the Church’s ability to 
own land, exact a compulsory tithe, regu-
late marriage, and maintain its religious 
hegemony.5 Guatemala became the first 
country in Latin America to allow reli-
gious freedom, potentially allowing for 
the establishment of Protestant churches, 
which Liberals believed were more 
in line with the changing world. This 
religious freedom lasted only one year, 
however, as a peasant army funded and 
controlled by the conservative oligarchy 
ended the Liberal government’s modern-
ization policies.6 As a precursor of what 
was to occur in the future, the use of 
violence ensured the country remained 
the colonial-style fiefdom desired by the 
landed elite.
 Religion became a key component in 
this ideological battle between Con-
servatives and Liberals over the fate 
of Guatemala. Conservative Party rule 
over the next thirty years saw a return 
of the Catholic Church to its former 
prominence as an institution. While 
practically everyone in the country was 
nominally Catholic, religious practices 
varied greatly along regional and social 
lines, ranging from strict adherence to 
Catholicism to syncretism of Mayan and 
Catholic beliefs.7 The inhabitants of the 
western highlands were largely of indige-
nous descent – approximately 70 percent 
of the entire country was either Maya or 
of Mayan ancestry. This segment of the 
population remained largely autonomous 
of the central government, basing their 
social organization almost entirely upon 
the cofradía – a self-governing social, 
political, and economic network made up 
of individual ethnicities aligned loosely 
around the local Catholic Church.8 These 
independent Indian social structures 
allowed the people to remain free of gov-
ernment influence and practice their own 
“Mayanized folk Catholicism.”9 The cof-
radía’s autonomy from both the Catholic 
hierarchy and the central government 
provided indigenous groups with a means 
of collective resistance against Liberal 
modernization schemes.10 A violent up-
rising led by the Liberals in 1871 brought 
about a change in political leadership, 
and with it a renewed attack on the role 
of the Catholic Church in Guatemalan 
society. Two years later, “Supreme Com-
mander of the Guatemalan Republic” 
Justo Rufino Barrios (r. 1873-1885) again 
declared religious freedom in Guate-
mala.11 The Liberals were once again 
looking to modernize the country, hoping 
to break the power of both the Catholic 
Church and the cofradías in the process. 
In keeping with their practice of looking 
to the West for inspiration, as well as for 
successful models of economic develop-
ment and progress, the Liberals sought to 
transplant Western religion, i.e. Protes-
tantism, into Guatemala.
 The presence of such a high concentra-
tion of Indians in Guatemala is important 
for understanding the decision by the 
Liberal regime to allow, and actively pro-
mote, Protestantism in the country. The 
government believed that allowing the 
free exercise of religion would encourage 
European immigration to Guatemala.12 In 
an age when social Darwinism prevailed, 
notions of racial superiority fostered 
the government’s belief that significant 
structural change and westernization 
could only come from the top down.13 
Therefore, any attempt to modernize 
Guatemala had to begin with a pro-
gram of public education carried out by 
Protestant missionaries.14 Implementa-
tion of the plan would further restrict the 
traditional role of the Catholic Church, 
while potentially providing a means with 
which to indoctrinate indigenous popula-
tions with a pro-Western and submissive 
ideology in the future.15 Eventually, the 
government envisioned that the complete 
overhaul of Guatemalan society would 
occur, forcing the indigenous popula-
tions to change in the process. In 1882, 
President Barrios personally went to the 
Presbyterian Board of Foreign Ministers 
in New York City to request missionar-
ies be sent from the United States, and 
in the following year the first Protestant 
Church was established in Guatemala; 
its mission was converting the wealthy 
of the capital city.16 While the program 
was largely unsuccessful, it opened the 
way for other Protestant sects to gain a 
foothold in Guatemala and perform their 
missionary work.17 Because the cofradías 
coalesced loosely around local Catholic 
parishes, breaking the religious monop-
oly of the institutional Church was the 
logical method to combat their power. In 
its attempt to promote the modernization 
of the small Central American country, 
the Liberal regime openly challenged the 
supremacy of the Catholic Church by 
allowing Protestant missionaries to enter 
the autonomous indigenous communities 
in the countryside.
 The modern Guatemalan state slowly 
began to take shape. The autonomy of 
the Indian communities began giving 
way to landowning Ladinos – indigenous 
Central Americans who embraced Eu-
ropean over Native culture. This change 
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in control over local politics allowed the 
newly professionalized army to consoli-
date its power at the national level, fo-
menting the rise of authoritarian military 
rule.18 Despite the promise of Western-
ization and their foray into the country’s 
wealthy communities, Protestants had 
little influence in this transition after their 
arrival in 1883. Subsequently, they de-
voted their efforts primarily to mission-
ary work among the indigenous popula-
tions, concentrating on literacy programs 
and rural development projects over the 
next several decades. As the world fell 
into a global economic depression in the 
1930s, concerns about backward Indians 
slowing down the nation’s progress were 
replaced by fears about a literate indig-
enous population rising up against the 
landowning elite in a popular, “commu-
nist” revolt.19 Suddenly, the autonomous, 
ignorant Indian became appealing to a 
government wanting to secure its hold 
on power. The regime of General Jorge 
Ubico (r. 1931-1944) therefore began to 
limit the number of Protestant mission-
aries allowed into the country, despite 
its association with the Liberal Party.20 
Ubico’s actions regarding both Indians 
and Protestant missionaries were indica-
tive of how the Guatemalan ruling class 
viewed religion as nothing more than a 
tool to advance their political agenda. 
Since Guatemalan independence in 1824, 
the elites had used religion as a means 
to achieve social control. Whichever 
religious ideology the authorities could 
manipulate to ensure their hold on power 
while maintaining Indigenous compla-
cency was the version they would of-
ficially espouse. While religion may have 
embodied the Word of God, it became 
the will of the Guatemalan government.
 This all began to change in 1944 with 
the postscripted “ten years of spring.”21 A 
military coup labeled the “October Revo-
lution” and subsequent open elections 
ushered Juan José Arevalo (r. 1944-1951) 
into power as President of Guatemala. 
Invoking the nation’s unique religious 
situation, Arevalo referred to his plan 
for Guatemala as “spiritual socialism.”22 
He believed that neither Marxism nor 
capitalism on their own were viable 
economic systems for Guatemala; his 
policy was an innovative precursor to 
Chilean President Salvador Allende’s 
experiment in finding a “third way.” 
Instead, Arevalo’s strategies of economic 
nationalism, development projects, 
popular organization, and reforms in 
land, labor, and education policies began 
moving Guatemala towards becoming 
a more equitable country.23 Arevalo’s 
administration promised to provide all 
of Guatemala’s people with a “square 
deal,” which meant avoiding the abuses 
and corruptions of the past, including 
the use of religion as a tool of social 
manipulation.24 Nonetheless, the Arevalo 
government reinstituted past policies 
by utilizing Evangelical missionaries to 
implement a nationwide basic education 
project aimed at the poor.25 However, 
instead of attempting to indoctrinate 
indigenous communities into a pro-West-
ern ideology, the Arevalo administration 
drew upon Protestant missionaries be-
cause of their belief that literal reading of 
the Bible is necessary for salvation.26 The 
Guatemalan government again favored 
Protestantism, but this time as a tool to 
improve literacy and society in general 
by a government working for the benefit 
of the entire population.
 While President Arevalo had some 
support from Protestant groups, by 1951 
the newly elected President Jacobo 
Arbenz Guzmán (r. 1951-1954) incurred 
the wrath of Guatemala’s religious 
communities. Despite his baptism as a 
Protestant, Arbenz’s reputation as a com-
munist sympathizer led all but the most 
radically leftist religious away from the 
newly elected President.27 The conser-
vative Guatemalan Catholic Church 
was perhaps the most vocal religious 
opponent of the President, working fer-
vently to mobilize opposition within the 
country.28 Weakened from over 100 years 
of Liberal onslaughts, fear that a com-
munist government would completely 
stamp them out led the Church to oppose 
vehemently what they believed were 
socialist tendencies in the democratic 
government.29 Yet with only 132 priests 
throughout the entire country in 1950, 
their opposition was ineffective at best.30 
Such tactics were not needed, however, 
as there were other, more powerful enti-
ties that felt threatened by Guatemala’s 
emerging democracy. 
 External forces, namely the United 
Fruit Company (UFCO) and the United 
States government, were more than 
adequate to end Guatemala’s democratic 
experiment. These outside groups, by 
providing funding, training, and air 
support for a conservative counter-
revolutionary movement led by Colonel 
Carlos Castillo Armas, forced Arbenz 
to resign on 27 June 1954.31 With help 
from the United States government, both 
Guatemala and UFCO’s lucrative banana 
plantations were safe from the threat of 
international communism sinisterly pos-
ing under the guise of a democratically 
elected administration. In the name of 
thwarting communism, efforts to bring 
about true, progressive modernization 
were jettisoned in one swift and decisive 
act, this time by the very country looked 
upon as a model. The military once again 
ruled Guatemala, and it would work to 
maintain that control at any cost.
 Shortly after the coup, Colonel Carlos 
Castillo Armas (r. 1954-1957) took 
power as the country’s president with the 
goal of undoing the progressive reforms 
of the previous administration. Because 
the new president had received strong 
support in the months leading up to the 
coup from the conservative Catholic 
Church, the constitution drafted after the 
change in government contained a very 
pro-clerical slant, giving the institu-
tion back privileges it had not had since 
before independence.32 In this time of 
upheaval, the Protestant groups that had 
worked closely with the Arevalo govern-
ment were labeled as communist sym-
pathizers.33 Indigenous converts in the 
western highlands subsequently became 
the victims of sporadic anti-communist 
attacks.34 Despite the conservative fervor 
of the new U.S.-backed regime, Castillo 
Armas’s political inclinations were that 
of a traditional, unreconstructed Liber-
al.35 Therefore, while the government 
ignored the random violence perpetrated 
against Protestants because of the desire 
to see Guatemala modernize, Castillo Ar-
mas did not allow the new constitution to 
reinstate Catholicism as the official state 
religion.36 Although some Protestants had 
worked with the previous “communist” 
regime, not all were expelled from Gua-
temala in the wave of anti-communist 
zeal due to the long-standing idea that 
different, more conformist Protestant 
ideologies afforded the country the best 
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chance for modernization. The military 
regime could still exploit ideologies that 
focused on individual salvation, personal 
responsibility, and submission to author-
ity instead of those that promoted literacy 
and social change. The Guatemalan 
government needed a more complacent 
version of Christianity, either Protestant 
or Catholic, to be disseminated among 
the indigenous population if their mod-
ernization schemes were ever to succeed.
 The Catholic hierarchy hoped to use 
its relationship with the new right-wing 
government to rebuild the power and 
prominence of the Church. Despite still 
having to deal with its upstart competitor 
for the souls of the Guatemalan masses, 
one important privilege the Catholic 
Church regained was the return of for-
eign religious to the country.37 The hier-
archy initially believed this would benefit 
the institution, since the new religious 
would help replenish the understaffed 
ranks of the Church. The hierarchy also 
believed that their support of the coup 
would ensure that the government would 
no longer work against the institution’s 
attempts to keep Catholicism relevant in 
Guatemala. The Church expected that 
their denunciation of the Arbenz admin-
istration would end the government’s 
love affair with Protestantism. Unbe-
knownst to the Guatemalan Catholic 
hierarchy, however, events would shortly 
transpire that would change the look, and 
the message, of Catholicism throughout 
Latin America and the world. To the 
chagrin of the conservative Guatemalan 
hierarchy, the Church would become 
relevant in a completely new way.
 Changes associated with the con-
vening of Second Vatican Ecumenical 
Council in Rome from 1962 to 1965 
ultimately led to the creation and devel-
opment of Liberation Theology. Later 
known as Vatican II, Pope John XXIII 
summoned this meeting of the Catholic 
leadership from all over the world to deal 
with modernizing the archaic institution. 
Out of this congregation, the Church 
changed from a generally conservative, 
pro-establishment institution to one that 
supported democracy, human rights, 
and social change.38 While this meet-
ing initiated a fundamental shift within 
the Church around the world, the most 
important aspect of Vatican II for the 
Church in Latin America was that it led 
some in the hierarchy to look more criti-
cally at their Church and the societies 
in which they lived.39 This critical look 
crystallized in 1968 at the Latin Ameri-
can Bishop’s Conference in Medellin, 
Colombia. What emerged from Medellin 
was a different Church, one that in theory 
no longer expected the poor to stoically 
face their lot in life and obediently await 
entrance to heaven as the reward for their 
suffering.40 Drawing on Latin America’s 
economic and international situation, 
socially and politically progressive 
members of the Church hierarchy gave 
anti-imperialism, class struggle, and 
social revolution a previously unknown 
Christian character.41 They argued that 
Christians should be active and engaged 
in working towards a positive transfor-
mation of society and the world.42 In Me-
dellin, an ideology emerged in which its 
adherents viewed sin no longer solely as 
an individual issue but as an institutional 
problem.43 In addition to these changes 
in outlook, there was also a shift in 
ideas concerning the secular role of the 
Church. Some within the Church were so 
involved with advancing the cause of the 
poor and disenfranchised that a group of 
Bishops at Medellin declared: 
We express our desire to be very 
close always to those who work in 
the self-denying apostolate with 
the poor in order that they will 
always feel our encouragement 
and know that we will not listen to 
parties interested in distorting their 
work.44
 
In Latin America, Liberation Theology 
eventually evolved out of this fundamen-
tal transformation in Catholic doctrine. 
Author Philip Berryman defined this 
ideology as:
 
An interpretation of Chris-• 
tian faith out of the suffering, 
struggle, and hope of the poor; 
A critique of society and the • 
ideologies sustaining it; 
A critique of the activity of the • 
Church and of Christians from 
the angle of the poor.45
The Catholic Church finally took notice 
of the dismal poverty, lavish wealth, and 
political repression that were rampant 
throughout Latin America. At both Vati-
can II and the Latin American Bishop’s 
Conference, the hierarchy reevaluated 
the official stance on the temporal role 
of the Church and a brave few within 
the clergy decided to stand up and take 
action. Among the ranks of those who 
could no longer sit idly by, witnessing 
the diabolic destruction of their societies, 
Liberation Theology was born.  
 In 1971 Gustavo Gutiérrez wrote a 
seminal book in which he describes the 
transformation taking place in the Catho-
lic Church throughout Latin America. 
The term Liberation Theology originated 
from Gutiérrez’s book entitled A Theol-
ogy of Liberation. Liberation Theology 
sought to address means with which to 
escape from the poverty that enslaved 
the vast majority of Latin Americans. 
Gutiérrez argued that there was a need to 
end the cycle of dependence that plagues 
Latin American countries in relation to 
the West.46 In advocating such a change, 
Gutiérrez utilized ideas associated with 
dependency theory, which states that the 
leading powers of the world (particularly 
the United States) have used their eco-
nomic strength to ensure Latin America’s 
development is dependent solely on 
the interests of those same powers.47 
Instead of developing a diverse economy 
similar to those nations in the industrial-
ized world, these dependent countries 
export primary goods, such as alumi-
num, bananas, cotton, etc., controlled by 
the wealthy elite, making a subjugated 
working class necessary to ensure the 
system’s smooth operation.48 With the 
world split along the ideological lines of 
the Cold War, Gutiérrez’s message to end 
this system was highly controversial. The 
military leaders of many Latin American 
countries, such as Guatemala, considered 
arguments like Gutiérrez’s, which did not 
overtly advocate the free-market capital-
ist ideologies of the Western world, akin 
to communism and a potential danger to 
their hold on social control.
 While Gutiérrez never actually 
advocates an overt Marxist-Leninist 
overthrow of the capitalist system in 
his book, he phrases the call for libera-
tion within a framework of homegrown, 
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hemispheric socialist change.49 What 
sets Gutiérrez’s ideology apart from 
other calls for revolution is the inherent 
Christian component of his message. He 
seeks to bring Marxism into the Christian 
fold within the specific Latin Ameri-
can context.50 Because an anti-socialist 
doctrine had imbued Christianity for so 
long, it was the duty of Liberationists 
such as Gutiérrez to free people from 
the ideological fallacies associated with 
socialism.51 Given the abject poverty 
and opulent wealth of Latin America and 
the changes that had occurred within the 
Church’s doctrine, there was no other 
option but for Christians to side with the 
revolutionaries, in spirit at least if not in 
action.52 Gutiérrez goes so far as to en-
courage and validate justifiable violence 
perpetrated at the hands of those fighting 
for liberation against the weapons and 
armies of oppression and dependence.53 
Liberation Theology openly challenged 
the role of the Catholic Church as the 
spiritual sanctuary of Latin America’s 
wealthy elite. Contrary to the seemingly 
tacit support of Liberation Theology 
from Vatican II and the Medellin Confer-
ence, the ideology created divisions 
within the Catholic Church unseen since 
the Reformation.54 There was an open 
battle within the Church between those 
adopting the “preferential option for the 
poor” and those who still adhered to “the 
values of tradition, the institutional and 
sacral aspects of the Church, and hierar-
chical authority.”55 In a time of cultural 
change at the grassroots level, albeit with 
global ramifications, not even the Catho-
lic Church could avoid the ominous 
upheaval looming on the horizon.
 Despite the reluctance of some within 
the highest levels of the Church hier-
archy to change, radical priests and lay 
workers were not the only adherents to 
Liberation Theology. Many members of 
the Catholic Church throughout Latin 
America subscribed to the ideology and 
promoted it in writings, in sermons, and 
in their parishes. They used the ideol-
ogy to give new perspective to a variety 
of subjects, including Christianity’s role 
in the political realm, the morality of 
resistance to repression, and the need for 
social justice.56 Fundamental to Lib-
eration Theology is a passage from the 
bishops at Vatican II that states:
In the Old Testament God reveals 
himself to us as the liberator of 
the oppressed and the defender 
of the poor, demanding from man 
faith in him and justice towards 
man’s neighbour. It is only in the 
observance of the duties of justice 
that God is truly recognized as the 
liberator of the oppressed…. Christ 
lived his life in the world as a total 
giving of himself to God for the 
salvation and liberation of men.57
 
Because issues of justice and oppres-
sion were so pertinent to their particu-
lar diocese, many bishops throughout 
Latin America slowly began converting 
to the tenets of Liberation Theology. 
Gone were the days when the Church 
promoted social action while simultane-
ously denouncing any participation in 
the realm of politics.58 In the span of 
just over a decade, the Church in Latin 
America went from working hand-in-
hand with the established oligarchy in 
fighting popular uprisings it perceived 
to be communist to having prominent 
priests disseminate ideas that violent 
revolution may in fact be justified by the 
teachings of Jesus Christ. During this 
transitional period within the Church, re-
ligious involved with the Catholic Action 
program from all over the world came 
to Guatemala. Brought in by Archbishop 
Mariano Rossell y Arellano shortly after 
the U.S.-backed coup in 1954, their task 
consisted of strengthening the Church 
and reenergizing the faithful.
 Once these priests and workers began 
to proselytize in the northwestern high-
lands of Guatemala, they saw the living 
conditions the indigenous population 
faced in Departments such as Huehu-
etenango, Quiché, Chimaltenango, and 
Alta Verapaz. This new perspective 
made the ecclesiastical emphasis of their 
mission seem inconsequential when 
compared with efforts to improve the 
social and economic conditions of their 
parishioners.59 Traditionally a conserva-
tive organization, members of Catholic 
Action that came to Guatemala began 
taking progressive stances because of 
the circumstances they witnessed in the 
country.60 Foreign Catholic priests and 
workers in Guatemala became more con-
cerned with economic development and 
education projects, working in popular 
movements at the community level in 
predominately indigenous areas.61 This 
is how Christian base communities de-
veloped. These grassroots organizations 
allowed people to organize and become 
involved in participatory democracy, 
albeit only at the local level.62 The 
participants, called catechists, selected 
leaders from their own ranks who then 
became responsible for disseminating 
the message of Liberation Theology.63 
While these communities began after 
the arrival of foreign Catholic workers 
following the 1954 coup, they proved to 
be the most important, and most subver-
sive, work of Catholic activists among 
the people of Guatemala during the civil 
war.64 In the department of Quiché, for 
example, by the late 1970s there were 
several thousand catechists with close 
ties to traditional indigenous communi-
ties.65 These communities harkened back 
to the cofradía and openly challenged 
the existing political and social order, 
incurring the wrath of those in control 
of the country’s economic and political 
machinery. 
 With the help of both these indigenous 
and foreign adherents to Liberation 
Theology, the peasantry began to take on 
a more active role in resisting oppres-
sion. On a theoretical level, the doctrine 
of bettering the lives of the poor through 
economic and political development was 
more important to Liberation Theology 
than the principle of heavenly salva-
tion through faith in Christ.66 Therefore, 
the local residents and catechists, not 
the priests, made all major decisions 
concerning the base communities.67 With 
assistance from the religious, indigenous 
villages started cooperatives through 
which they bypassed merchants looking 
to exploit what little resources they pos-
sessed.68 Unfortunately, these coopera-
tives could only help those indigenous 
people with sufficient financial means. 
Consequently, many on both sides of 
the political spectrum questioned their 
validity. While some Indians perceived 
the cooperatives as doing nothing for 
the landless peasantry, the overzealous 
government viewed them as communist 
subterfuges.69 Despite these setbacks, 
Catholic workers emphasized collec-
tively working together for the advance-
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ment of all; how exploitative practices 
were sinful in the eyes of the Lord; and 
how Jesus Christ had fought against 
imperialistic practices in his time.70 Thus, 
the peasant communities of Guatemala 
began utilizing the strategies that would 
later evolve into a theology of liberation 
before the ideology had even been given 
its name.
 Among the influx of Catholic Action 
religious entering the country, perhaps 
the most prolific was the Maryknoll 
Order based in New York. Although the 
religious order had never identified with 
any specific political ideology, this began 
to change when the Maryknoll priests 
and nuns began their work in Guatemala. 
By identifying sin as a social phenom-
enon, Liberation Theology tended to blur 
the line between religion and politics.71 
The conditions that the religious work-
ers saw led some of them to look for 
ways outside the spiritual realm to exact 
change, even advocating the necessary 
use of violence.72 A specific group of reli-
gious workers exceeding their traditional 
role as God’s representatives and becom-
ing intimately involved in the revolution-
ary cause spawned what became known 
in Guatemala as the “Melville case.”73 
This incident, while being the first of 
many involving religious revolutionar-
ies in the country, exemplified what the 
Guatemalan military regime feared most 
about progressive Catholic activists: the 
use of religion to justify taking up arms 
in the name of social justice.
 Two priests, Tom and Art Melville, 
along with a nun named Marian Peter, 
had been working in Guatemala since 
the 1950s; they and other Maryknollers 
were some of the first foreign religious 
to arrive in the country via Catholic Ac-
tion. While the Melville brothers were 
proselytizing in the indigenous western 
highlands, Sister Marian was teaching in 
an upper-class high school in Guatemala 
City.74 As their work progressed, the 
brothers began to realize the limitations 
of development projects in remedying 
the problems of the peasantry. More-
over, Christian base communities, while 
helping to spread the ideas of the new 
Liberation Theology, were doing little to 
end government oppression and vio-
lence. Sister Marian Peter, also feeling a 
sense of frustration, began to take high 
school students to work with the rural 
poor in these base communities.75 She 
too became disillusioned with the lack of 
progress. These religious searched for a 
way to bring about reform, leading them 
into a relationship with other groups 
of people working towards revolution, 
elevating the use of religion as a weapon 
of war in Guatemala to a new level.
 Seeing firsthand the conditions faced 
by the rural poor of Guatemala, these 
religious workers realized that revolu-
tion was the only way to break the cycle 
of poverty and provide a ray of hope for 
the country’s oppressed. Utilizing the 
connections of some of Sister Marian’s 
students, the three contacted the gue-
rilla leader Luis Turcios Lima in 1967 
and decided to join the revolution.76 
The rebels, from the Fuerzas Arma-
das Rebeldes, or Rebel Armed Forces 
(FAR), utilized their new connections 
with these three religious to recruit from 
the indigenous communities, which had 
traditionally sought autonomy and were 
reluctant to join Ladino-led resistance 
movements like the FAR.77 The FAR and 
subsequent rebel groups realized that 
Church organizations, whether they were 
base communities or similar progressive 
groups, had much better relationships 
and communication with indigenous 
communities.78 At this time, however, the 
rebels had nearly been annihilated by a 
particularly violent counter insurgency 
campaign; this was their last ditch ef-
fort at maintaining their presence in the 
country.79 Though the rebels were trying 
to develop both a Christian and an indig-
enous presence in their revolution, it was 
to no avail. Both Church and government 
officials discovered the plan, expelling 
the Melvilles (along with Sister Marian) 
from Guatemala.80 This incident exempli-
fied for the army the latent danger posed 
by progressive members of the Church 
to the ruling oligarchy’s monopoly on 
power and control. Grassroots work done 
by Catholic activists could potentially 
threaten the oligarchy’s iron grip on the 
indigenous peasant majority, even more 
so than isolated bands of rebels con-
stantly on the run from the U.S.-funded 
and -trained military. This concern of 
the military would lead to the start of a 
second, ideological front in the civil war, 
one to maintain social control more ef-
fectively.
 While many foreign workers con-
nected with the Catholic Church were in-
volved with the poor in developing ways 
to better their lives, Protestant churches 
were actively expanding in Guatemala. 
Earlier, unsuccessful forays into the 
realm of politics left these churches 
advocating a more otherworldly message 
instead of proselytizing about social ills 
and the need for popular action to enact 
societal change. As violence associated 
with the civil war increased in the mid-
1960s, some people turned to Protestant 
churches looking for answers. Millenari-
anist neo-Pentecostal sects preaching 
individual salvation for the righteous 
and obedience to authority in seemingly 
apocalyptic times broke off from the 
traditional churches.81 Eventually these 
neo-Pentecostal churches began to split 
as well, creating homegrown Guatemalan 
congregations, usually meeting in peo-
ple’s homes and often consisting of only 
a few members.82 While these churches 
were anti-Catholic in nature, they 
espoused patriotism and the doctrinal 
message of resignation – the traditionally 
conservative belief in accepting one’s 
fate in life and submitting to the will of 
authority. 83 The military government 
hoped to utilize this message in order to 
counter the social activism embraced by 
the Liberationists in the indigenous com-
munities. While Guatemalan Protestant 
sects were branching off into apocalyptic 
realms completely devoid of political in-
volvement, the Guatemalan government 
was endeavoring to exploit the Pente-
costal message as another tool of social 
control. 
 This situation came to fruition, oddly 
enough, with an act of nature. Early 
in the morning of 4 February 1976, an 
earthquake that registered 7.5 on the 
Richter scale struck the north-central part 
of the country. Over 22,000 people died, 
three times that number was seriously 
injured, and another one million people 
– nearly one-sixth of the country – were 
homeless after the catastrophe.84 The 
tragedy affected the poor in Guatemala 
City and the Department of Chimaltenan-
go the worst since their adobe homes 
were poorly constructed and hence more 
susceptible to damage from the cata-
clysmic tremor.85 This devastating event 
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made it necessary for the government 
to ask outside countries, particularly the 
United States, for help. In addition to 
aid from the U.S. government, a large 
amount of resources came by way of 
North American Protestant churches, 
which saw the earthquake as an oppor-
tunity to further proselytizing efforts in 
a country seemingly forsaken by God.86 
While these churches spent their resourc-
es in rebuilding the homes of the poor 
(while many of whom actually needed 
help planting their crops before it was 
too late in the season), their recruitment 
efforts focused largely on the wealthy 
elite of Guatemala City, including future 
President José Efraín Ríos Montt.87 
Despite the fact that these churches 
concentrated their recruitment efforts 
almost exclusively on the Guatemalan 
elite, the wealthy were not the only ones 
that joined the congregations. Overall 
church membership jumped almost fif-
teen percent in the months immediately 
following the earthquake.88 This number 
is deceiving, however, as the monetary 
generosity bestowed upon those who 
adhered to the benefactor’s protestant 
religious beliefs played a major part in 
increasing the number of converts to the 
flock.89 For the government, this rise in 
conversions to Protestantism was another 
positive development in their ongoing 
effort to modernize Guatemala. In addi-
tion to the arrival of foreign missionaries 
and relief efforts, the earthquake and 
ensuing chaos served as a catalyst for 
already rapacious land seizures by people 
searching for oil deposits or fertile cattle 
lands.90 These assaults on both their 
traditional ways of life and their lands 
now forced indigenous people who once 
sought autonomy to look for ways in 
which to mobilize resistance. 
 As the threat of losing their land com-
pounded the ever-present violence, the 
peasantry began to look for ways to mo-
bilize. Rebel groups consisting of survi-
vors of the first counterinsurgency cam-
paigns in the 1960s began reemerging 
in indigenous regions and establishing 
relations with the residents.91 Following 
the example of the Catholic activists and 
Liberationists, the rebel groups worked 
to create better, more productive relation-
ships with the indigenous populations. 
They began to work together with indig-
enous populations on issues in need of 
immediate attention, such as the killing 
of right-wing landowners and military 
officers who were excessively abusive.92 
Along with rebel groups, activist Catho-
lic priests were still working in Guatema-
la. The indigenous communities that had 
been involved in base communities, and 
that had seen the brunt of the military’s 
violence in suppressing the first wave of 
rebel activities, began to organize under 
the leadership of these Catholic priests.93 
On 29 May 1978, a group of Kekchi 
Indians descended on the northern town 
of Panzos to ask authorities for help in 
protecting them from inevitable land 
seizures.94 Following the standard policy 
of violently suppressing any confronta-
tion, the military unleashed its destruc-
tive forces on the unarmed group of 
Indians, killing well over one hundred.95 
This massacre signaled the start of the 
most brutal years of the Guatemalan 
civil war, when just over a month later 
General Fernando Romeo Lucas García 
(r. 1978-1981) succeeded General Kjell 
Eugenio Laugerud García (r. 1974-1978) 
as president in another fraudulent elec-
tion. The Lucas presidency would be the 
most corrupt and violent reign of terror 
that Guatemala had witnessed up to that 
point in the nearly two-decade-long civil 
war.
 This became the most brutal period 
of the war as the guerillas became more 
politically and militarily active than 
at any other point in the conflict. One 
of the main reasons for this was that 
the guerilla organizations, which had 
largely been comprised of middle-class 
Ladinos during the 1960s, now had the 
support of a large number of the Indians 
in the regions where they operated.96 A 
group known as Ejercito Guerrillero de 
los Pobres, or the Guerilla Army of the 
Poor (EGP), began briefly occupying 
regions of the highlands, and by mid- 
1979, another group called Organización 
Pueblo en Armas, or the People-in-Arms 
Organization (ORPA) began utilizing the 
same tactics.97 Indigenous people were 
collaborating with, and even joining, 
these resistance groups in ever-increasing 
numbers.98 For the first time in the Gua-
temalan civil war, revolutionary groups 
began taking the offensive.99 Because 
Catholic activists had first organized the 
indigenous into base communities and 
served as the conduit for Liberation The-
ology’s “preferential option for the poor,” 
Catholics bore the brunt of the political 
violence during the Lucas regime.100 Be-
cause of the work that Catholic activists 
had done during the 1960s, the regions 
where base communities were located 
emerged as the areas in which the rebels 
had the most success.101 In retaliation, by 
the end of 1979 the army had essentially 
put the Indigenous communities in the 
northwest highlands under siege.102 In 
January 1980, a large group of Indians 
came to the capital to plead their case to 
the public. What followed would catapult 
the civil war onto the international stage 
and usher in the beginning of an even 
greater level of violence in the battle for 
the hearts and minds of the Guatemalan 
peasantry.
 On 31 January 1980, twenty-three 
peasants, along with five labor and 
university leaders, took over the Spanish 
embassy in Guatemala City. Many who 
were involved in the occupation were 
themselves Catholic activists.103 Al-
though the Spanish ambassador Máximo 
Cajal was willing to meet with the oc-
cupiers, feeling that their actions were 
justified considering what was transpir-
ing in their communities, several hundred 
police and military personnel arrived at 
the embassy and placed it under siege.104 
In spite of the Ambassador’s protests, 
the Guatemalan authorities attacked 
the embassy, causing an explosion and 
subsequent fire.105 The pleas of onlook-
ers went unheeded as the Guatemalan 
authorities, refusing to allow firefighters 
on the scene, watched as twenty-seven 
of the twenty-eight occupiers and twelve 
of their hostages burned to death in the 
blaze.106 Despite international outrage 
and a severance of diplomatic relations 
by Spain, the “Spanish Embassy mas-
sacre” only increased the government’s 
repression of the indigenous communi-
ties, initiating the most brutal phase of 
the war and the beginning of the push 
towards coerced Protestant conversion.
 Anyone associated with Catholicism in 
the indigenous regions of Guatemala was 
already under intense government sub-
jugation. Since guerillas were difficult 
to find or identify, and could potentially 
defend themselves, the army went after 
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anyone they believed was associated 
with the resistance, particularly those 
participating in Catholic activism.107 
Consequently, those who were not politi-
cally active converted to Protestantism in 
large numbers to avoid the brunt of the 
government’s force.108 This political and 
religious expediency was not, however, 
the only appeal of Protestantism to Gua-
temalans mired in a brutal, decades-long 
civil war. As Virginia Garrard-Burnett 
explains:
The attraction of such churches 
was plain: not only did their mes-
sage of a violent chaotic, unjust, 
and sinful world reflect believers’ 
reality, but it also rendered a larger 
meaning and cosmic plan from 
nearly incomprehensible terror. For 
believers, the promise of redemp-
tion in the hereafter was not simply 
deferred gratification, or “pie in 
the sky,” but a time for vindication, 
justice, empowerment, and reunion 
for the poor and oppressed, the 
inheritors of the earth entitled by 
Jesus Himself on the Sermon on 
the Mount.109
It was not just the idea of redemption 
in the afterlife, the financial help from 
missionaries, or the protection from the 
army that made Protestantism appealing 
to some indigenous Guatemalans. The 
churches had a welcoming atmosphere 
of popular religiosity, with services that 
often included time for singing, danc-
ing, and physical gestures towards the 
heavens.110 Compared to the stodginess 
of traditional Catholic mass, this vis-
ceral appeal contributed substantially to 
Protestant growth.111 There were many 
non-political conditions contributing to 
the unprecedented growth of Protestant 
churches in Guatemala. Nonetheless, 
these changes in the country’s spirituality 
would have immense political ramifica-
tions, especially for its most impover-
ished and marginalized inhabitants. 
 The government was cognizant of 
this rise in Protestantism and believed 
that they could utilize it to create a new 
political base. If Protestants literally ad-
hered to the biblical passage to “submit 
to the authority in power,” it could coun-
teract the Catholic activism occurring in 
the indigenous highlands.112 Despite the 
military’s desire for an obedient Protes-
tant populous, not all Protestants aligned 
themselves with the oppressive apparatus 
of the state. While a very small number 
of Protestants did join the rebels, for the 
most part they tacitly, and oftentimes 
actively, supported the military dicta-
torship.113 Their support, however, was 
often a survival strategy rather than a 
specific act of defiance against the rebels. 
For example, during the early 1980s in 
the Ixil town of Cotzal, located in the 
Quiché Department where the guerillas 
had a high level of support, the Prot-
estant congregation of the Full Gospel 
Church of God openly reported on gue-
rilla activities and collaborated with the 
army.114 They did this under duress in an 
effort to prevent their families, and their 
church, from falling victim to the army’s 
scorched-earth policies.115 Promotion of 
Protestantism was the tentative policy of 
the military government at the end of the 
1970s and the beginning of the 1980s. 
The ascension of a Fundamentalist Prot-
estant to the presidency, however, created 
a full-scale religious battle in the coun-
tryside, where forced coercion became 
a way of life throughout the indigenous 
regions of Guatemala.
 With every escalation in violence 
by the military, there was a concomi-
tant increase in guerilla activity in the 
highlands. In January 1982, all four of 
Guatemala’s guerilla groups announced 
they were joining forces and becoming 
the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional 
Guatemalteca, or Guatemalan National 
Revolutionary Unity (URNG).116 These 
guerillas consolidated their power and 
were becoming a significant threat. The 
military and oligarchy only had to look 
at what had transpired in neighboring 
Nicaragua, where a popular revolution 
just a few years earlier had toppled the 
Somoza family from power. The Gua-
temalan military regime believed that 
they needed to take drastic action in 
order to end this potential threat, and 
conventional violence was only strength-
ening the opposition’s support. Young 
military officers, believing that the Lucas 
regime’s gross corruption was under-
mining the war against the guerillas, 
orchestrated a coup to usher in a new era 
of counterrevolutionary warfare.117 The 
extensive violence and brutality of the 
war waged by the Lucas regime, while 
effective in killing peasants and Catholic 
activists, had failed in eradicating the 
guerillas. The next step was one that had 
been in development for one hundred 
years, an attempt at a total transformation 
that would completely alter Guatemalan 
society and forever end any political op-
position by imposing God’s Will of con-
formity and obedience onto the people of 
the small Central American nation.
 Guatemala needed a fundamentalist 
Protestant to lead the country through 
this monumental societal change. Herein 
lies the reason why the young officers 
who orchestrated the golpe (coup) in 
1982 chose the evangelical Efraín Ríos 
Montt to be president (r. 1982-1983), 
literally plucking him from teaching 
Sunday school at the Word Church in 
Guatemala City to be the next military 
dictator of the country.118 Seeing this 
conflict through a strictly religious 
perspective, the “born-again” Christian 
understood the guerilla movement to be a 
result of moral failings within the coun-
try.119 In order to end what Ríos Montt 
saw as the guerillas' assault on Guatema-
lan values, he would create “La Nueva 
Guatemala,” or the New Guatemala.120 
This would fundamentally change soci-
ety by basing it solely on the principles 
of morality, obedience to authority, and 
national unity.121 Ever since the introduc-
tion of Protestantism a century earlier, 
the Guatemalan government had sought 
to create a compliant, “modern” popula-
tion. Through unprecedented violence in 
the name of eradicating a rebellion, this 
modernization was about to be realized 
by a zealously fundamentalist President 
in the midst of a brutal civil war. The 
indigenous people of Guatemala would 
arrive in the modern Western world, 
not through development projects and 
proselytizing but through unimaginable 
death, destruction, and forced conver-
sion.
 Modernity and social peace would 
be achieved by way of a scorched-
earth policy the new President referred 
to as “fusiles y frijoles,” or “bullets 
and beans.”122 The “bullets” facet of 
the program, destroying the guerilla’s 
relationship with the indigenous com-
munities, was summed up best by one 
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army officer’s statement: “If you are 
with us, we’ll feed you, if you’re against 
us, we’ll kill you.”123 The “beans” por-
tion of this brutal pacification strategy 
consisted of creating the La Fundación 
de Ayuda al Pueblo Indígena, or the 
Foundation for Aid to the Indian People 
(FUNDAPI).124 Ríos Montt enlisted 
members of the Word Church (of which 
he was a member) to create an organiza-
tion for administering the contributions 
from North American evangelicals in 
order to provide food, shelter, clothing, 
and medicine to the refugees created 
by the counterinsurgency campaign.125 
In the process of razing over 440 vil-
lages to the ground, the military created 
FUNDAPI clients by displacing more 
than one million people.126 Another 
aspect of the “bullets and beans” plan 
was the vast expansion of the patrullas 
de autodefensa civil, or civil defense 
patrols (PACs), that originated under the 
Lucas regime.127 The army commanders 
of the PACs conscripted male Indians to 
fight against the rebels, giving them only 
wooden weapons if any at all.128 Instead 
of leaving the vast indigenous peasantry 
potentially to fight against the military, 
the PACs forced them to combat the reb-
els who were theoretically on their side 
in the liberation struggle. These civil-
ian militias were ragtag armies of men 
forced to go to war in the advancement 
of their own oppression. With a policy of 
burning people’s homes and then using 
potential starvation to force them to fight 
against their own interests, it is under-
standable why the government sought a 
way to enforce a sense of conformity and 
justification on these subjugated people.
 Indoctrination was vital to inculcate 
this sense of conformity. The “bullets 
and beans” policy targeted Catholic 
activists involved in Christian base com-
munities to the extent that in May 1982, 
the nation’s bishops described what was 
happening in Guatemala’s indigenous 
highlands as a “genocide.”129 They were 
only the first to claim this, however, 
as both Amnesty International and the 
United Nations later did so as well.130 
The military regime seemingly deemed 
everyone associated with Catholicism to 
be a communist and hunted them down 
like criminals. This coincided with a 
particularly large growth in membership 
among Protestant churches during the 
early 1980s, especially in those Churches 
that were encouraged by the govern-
ment to evangelize in the highland war 
zones.131 This growth was most apparent 
in “model villages,” where the FUNDA-
PI could use religious affiliation as a 
condition for aide. These work camps, 
created and controlled by the army and 
built atop the ruins of destroyed com-
munities by the relocated survivors of the 
“bullets and beans” campaign, were the 
penultimate step in the violent crusade to 
ensure social control.132 Those indigenous 
who survived would be the first inhabit-
ants of a brave new Guatemala. 
Under constant surveillance and the 
guise of benevolence, these villages 
constituted a sinister attempt to modern-
ize the campesinos, or peasants, through 
indoctrination and integration into the 
New Guatemala.133 The government tried 
to destroy traditional ethnic unity and 
isolate individuals by purposefully plac-
ing people from different villages and 
language groups together.134 While every-
one was stripped of their ethnic identity 
and forced to learn and speak only Span-
ish, the only outside institutions that were 
allowed into these villages were Protes-
tant Churches and the FUNDAPI.135 The 
number of Protestant converts swelled in 
these model villages because the military 
perceived those that did not convert as 
ostensibly opposing the government’s 
program. This was a critical aspect of 
the Guatemalan military’s psychological 
war against the indigenous population. 
With hundreds of thousands of people 
displaced and impoverished, the military 
left them with nowhere to turn but these 
horrific resettlement centers. The govern-
ment sought to ensure that the “rebel-
lious” Indians transformed into people 
grateful for the generosity shown them 
and who thank God for the life given 
to them. This was more than a military 
assault on guerilla activity or a violent 
insurgency; it was an all-out genocidal 
campaign pitting Evangelical Protestant-
ism against Liberation Theology, with the 
indigenous population caught in the mid-
dle. The Guatemalan government, under 
fundamentalist President Efraín Ríos 
Montt, used violence and fear to convert 
indigenous society into something that 
better suited the military regime’s desire 
for conformity and submission.
The crowning day for that transforma-
tion was to be the centennial celebra-
tion of Protestantism in Guatemala. In 
October 1982 the Argentine evangelist 
Luis Palau, renowned as “the Latin Billy 
Graham,” spoke to an estimated half 
million people in Guatemala City on 
the subject of Ríos Montt’s miracle.136 
On the surface, it seemed as though the 
“bullets and beans” campaign had done 
to both Guatemalan Catholicism and 
society in a few short months what the 
government, through traditional Prot-
estant missionaries, had been working 
at for over a century. Yet the Protestant 
experiment had cracks in its foundation. 
Because the numerous sects and factions 
of the Protestant community were not 
united squarely behind the President, 
there was little opposition when, as often 
happened with Guatemalan Presidents, 
Ríos Montt was ousted in a golpe on 8 
August 1983.137 Once the brutality of his 
campaign ended the crisis in the country-
side, disabled Catholic activism, and put 
the rebels back on the defensive, Ríos 
Montt’s inability to make headway in the 
country’s economic matters caused him 
to lose the support of the landed oligar-
chy.138 His cultural revolution was not as 
important to those in power as the price 
of coffee on the futures market. Nonethe-
less, Ríos Montt had been successful in 
destroying the indigenous revolution. 
Through the death of almost one-quarter 
million people, and the destruction of the 
survivor’s traditional way of life, General 
Ríos Montt had “miraculously” brought 
modernization to the indigenous people 
of Guatemala. 
The Ríos Montt administration tried to 
force the indigenous to remake their en-
tire society and abandon their beliefs or 
face the government’s wrath. That policy 
worked so well that the conversion rate 
to Protestantism among the indigenous 
continued to rise until it leveled out in 
1985 at around ten percent a year.139 
Throughout the Guatemalan civil war, 
when right-wing Protestants came into 
conflict with left-wing Catholic activists, 
both religious and political differences 
overlapped and developed into what in 
some instances resembled a holy war.140 
The threat of unspeakable violence and 
death notwithstanding, the indigenous 
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community internalized the fundamental-
ist message of conformity and obedience, 
replacing Liberation Theology’s message 
of liberty and justice for all.
This had been the decades-old plan 
of the military government. In order to 
placate their concerns about Liberation 
Theology and peasant social activism, 
the oligarchy-military cabal, seeing the 
already occurring rise in Protestantism, 
actively planned and initiated a strategy 
to convert the peasant population to a 
more palatable religious ideology. The 
long-held position of Protestantism as 
a tool of modernization in Guatemala, 
coupled with the violence occurring 
at the hands of the military, allowed 
for a strategy of Protestant conversion 
on a mass scale. The authorities both 
forcefully pushed modernization on 
the Indigenous populations and refuted 
Catholic-based ideas of social change 
and revolution. This occurred extensively 
and with the most brutality in the “model 
villages” that the military regime created 
to restructure Guatemalan indigenous 
society. The dictatorship was attempting 
to create an entirely new society, free of 
dissent and subversion, modeled after the 
conservative, Protestant countries of the 
West. They carried out this goal through 
violence, internment, enslavement, and 
attempted indoctrination and brainwash-
ing of over 60 percent of the country’s 
population. 
The capture and brainwashing of 
Father Pellecer is reminiscent of the 
situation faced by the indigenous people 
of Guatemala. Seeing Liberation Theol-
ogy as a threat, the military government 
tried to alter the mindset of the people 
to better suit its plans for the country. 
David Stoll, in his contribution to Robert 
Carmack’s compilation “Harvest of Vio-
lence,” quotes an evangelical missionary 
discussing the confrontation between 
Fundamentalist Protestantism and Lib-
eration Theology as stating that Cen-
tral America was “one of the strategic 
battlefields in the spiritual warfare over 
the allegiances and eternal destiny of the 
world’s inhabitants.”141 Indeed, to these 
people they were soldiers in a war; a war 
for the hearts and minds of the indig-
enous population that eventually reaped 
incredible havoc on an entire generation 
of Guatemalans in an attempt by the 
military to maintain social control. Lib-
eration Theology threatened the elite’s 
control over Guatemalan society, while 
Fundamentalist Protestantism gave hope 
to its preservation. While Guatemala may 
have seemed forsaken by God, in the 
eyes of those in power, God was work-
ing to help create, to quote the Funda-
mentalist Protestant former Guatemalan 
President Efraín Ríos Montt, “the new 
Israel of Central America.”142 
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